FURIOUS World Leaders FREEZE Trump OUT of NEW ALLIANCES

World leaders are absolutely furious at Donald Trump and his regime and we have seen a flurry of activity among world leaders Forming their alliances to counteract Donald Trump's threats threats to invade the Western Hemisphere threats to attack Europe Threats against the world. Let's take a look at what's going down You had France's President Emmanuel Macron giving

a very important speech the other day where he said it's time for new partnerships. It's time for new alliances. The international order is now changing and he says this idea that might is right means that what happens if Donald Trump invades Greenland, if Canada becomes the 51st state, if Taiwan gets invaded by China, Europe needs to be prepared for these things to happen as they may be imminent.

Here's what French President Emmanuel Macron has to say play this clip. It is not enough to simply conclude in the face of this withdrawal that the end times are near. No, the time has come to come up with new partnerships, as is the case, as I said, for defence. And the next issue is international governance, which is a broad topic. And it would be naive to say that all is well when I have just told you how chaotic it is,

that my right seems to be reigning and people are wondering if Greenland is about to be invaded or if Canada is about to become the 51st state or if Taiwan is under threat. Many of you discussed this with me. Actually, on the contrary, I think that times are right to reform international governance and perhaps it is the only opportunity to do so. And perhaps the right time has come to get more involved with the United Nations, given

that the number one member no longer believes in it, the second has less faith in it, and people are questioning all the values that we have defended on a daily basis.

Then you have the Prime Minister of Italy, Georgia, Maloney, and she says, let's talk about what deterrence means when it comes to Russia. She says the word deterrence comes from the Latin day via day to layer, meaning to scare. You must be strong enough to scare your and your enemy to cease and desist from the possibility of attacking you.

It is strength. It is scaring that needs to be asserted against people like Putin. And I think the implication was also against people like Donald Trump, because if you're not scaring them,

they think that they can dominate you, especially as Donald Trump is saying that he is the predator. And the Trump regime people are saying they are the predators of the world and they will invade, invade, invade.

Meanwhile, you have Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada stating the following, Canada and Germany are working together to strengthen their Euro-Atlantic security. He said he spoke with the Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany earlier today to talk about the ongoing negotiations toward a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, deepening our trade cooperation and our support for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Denmark, including Greenland.

Now this follows Germany and France speaking two days ago with other European countries about developing potential war plans against the United States if the United States invades Greenland, which would trigger the obligation of the other nations in NATO to go to war against the United States. Such is the condition of the international disorder caused by Donald Trump. And for every action, there are opposite reactions and consequences.

So for example, Moscow and Beijing, they're actually applauding Trump's invasion of Venezuela. Now sure, it may mean, well, they don't get their oil as cheap from Venezuela, but that Venezuela oil is not all that great to begin with. It costs a lot of money to refine. And so China, for example, is like, this actually gives us an opportunity to forge better relations with Canada.

We can buy Canadian oil, help prop up the Canadian economy, and maybe we get our EVs into Canada. More significantly though, I think for China and Russia beyond that they're just look to new opportunities in the you know in the world is that it now gives them justification to pursue a might means right mentality and if the Trump regime is lawless reckless malicious then who's stopping them they can just just say, hey, we want Taiwan.

We want Ukraine. We want Taiwan. Trump's foray into Venezuela emboldens Russia and China's own aggression. It goes on to say how they see this as an opportunity. Both Russia and China want to prioritize manipulating Trump to achieve more important interests for themselves than just Venezuela,

right in Venezuelan oil. I mean, if you even think about what that ExxonMobil CEO said during that bizarre press conference Donald Trump had in the White House on Friday, and they said it is uninvestable is what Exxon said, uninvestable unless there are massive structural changes in that country, not propping up Delcy Rodriguez and Díez Dado Cabello, the henchmen, and Delcy was intelligence services before. They're Maduro's peeps.

They're Maduro's peeps. I think it's also significant to note that while Donald Trump withholds air defense missiles, it's taking its toll on Ukraine. Right after the United States invaded Venezuela, Russia began escalating its attacks on Ukraine. They shot an Orishnik intermediary ballistic missile at Lviv. They also struck Kiev as Yulia Serebdenko explains last night for nearly five hours Russia struck residential buildings and civilian infrastructure in Kiev and other cities more than

240 drones and 36 missiles were used in the capital four people were killed

25 were injured in parts of Kiev electricity and water supplies were disrupted due to damage to substations, power lines and generation facilities. Work is underway to restore power to more than 500,000 people there. Russia deliberately targeting district heating plants. This is a, this is terrorism by Russia. So because of the US withholding air defense missiles, you see the Arishniks hitting Lviv.

You see 10 out of 22 caliber missiles, which usually get shot down. Eight of 13 ballistic missiles, 226 out of the 242 UAV, the Shahi drones, the Gerber drones, and the imitation drones have now been able to

hit targets where they're usually shot down. Kiev's mayor Klitschko urged residents to temporarily leave the city as Russia targets the critical infrastructure there. Also, Brazil's president Lula, he's been cooking over the past 24 to 36 hours as Alonzo Gourmendi writes in the past 36 hours Lula has quietly held high-level talks with the leaders of Canada, Spain, Mexico and Colombia

Specifically on Venezuela. He's cooking Prime Minister Carney of Canada says spoke with President Lula of Brazil We discussed the situation in Venezuela, we are steadfast in our support for a peaceful, negotiated and Venezuelan-led transition process that respects the democratic will of the Venezuelan people. Also, the European Union agreed to a sweeping trade pact with four South American countries earlier this week that would create one of the largest free trade zones in the world.

So as the United States tariffs the world, threatens to invade the world, we see the European Union entering to this agreement, a Mercosur agreement with Brazil, with Argentina, with Paraguay and Uruguay, and creating this free economic zone of about 700 million people. Here you have the UK Defense Secretary John Healey. Here's what he just said about Putin escalating the attacks on Ukraine since the United States invasion of Venezuela play this clip.

It's the big challenge to put in. He talks about peace, but he's stepping up and escalating his attacks, not to tax on the Ukrainian military, but on civilians and cities like this. And there were 90 shade drones attacking Kiev last night, many with targets at residential buildings like this.

It's brutal, it's cynical. It's exactly why we've got to work so hard to help Ukraine secure a peace.

And then we heard from the president of Columbia, Gustavo Petro, and he described, this is how I've been saying it I'm like ice is a paramilitary force in the United States like the collectivos like the Nazi and Italian fascist brigades here's how he describes it as they no longer just persecute Latin Americans they're killing US citizens right now here play

this clip right here.

Well, I think they need to reflect first and we left America need to come together. Many people took to the streets in Venezuelan cities, a huge number of people in Colombian cities and social unrest erupted in parts of the United States over an event unrelated to them but because of the murder of a citizen by ICE. For us, ICE operates the same way as the Nazi and Italian brigades, the fascists, and it has reached to the point where they no longer just persecute Latin Americans in

the streets, which for us is an affront, but they also kill citizens of the United States.

And while all of that's taking place, you've got Donald Trump saying to Denmark, we're going to do this the easy way or the hard way when it comes to Greenland. Here, play this clip. I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way, but if we don't do it the easy way, we're going to do it the hard way. Now, I want to bring in the former White House Deputy National Security Advisor, John Finer. Finer also served in the Obama administration, where he was the chief of staff to the Secretary of State Kerry at the time.

And he was also in the, as I said, in the Obama administration. And then in the Biden administration, rather, he was the former White House Deputy National Security Advisor in the Biden administration.

Obama, he worked in the Secretary of State as the chief of staff. Let's bring in John Finer right now. By the way, John Finer also hosts a podcast with our friend, Jake Sullivan, and the podcast, former National Security Advisor for Biden.

That podcast is called the Long Game Podcast. Check it out. It's great to see. I've got a lot to discuss with you. I wanna talk though about just more broadly what you see is taking place with whatever the heck

this foreign policy is of the Trump regime. I think Marco Rubio, early on if people were listening to him in January, started talking about this idea of spheres of influence and he mentioned three countries in what he said. He said, the United States was the West.

He said Russia controls its area, which seemed to indicate Europe also. And then he said China controls Asia. And that was what he said in foreign policy circles. People were talking about that. But now are we seeing the kind of manifestation

of that vision?

From your perch, what do you see? So there's always a risk with this administration that when you start to characterize a strategy or a vision or a doctrine, we sometimes say in foreign policy, that you're actually imposing more coherence

on their approach than it's actually warranted. But I'll give a shot, which is I think they actually start one step more abstract than what you just said, which is they basically subscribe to the view that in foreign policy, might makes right.

And not just might makes right as a descriptive matter. That's how the world works. But might makes right is how the world should work, according to them. So from that flows this idea that big countries, strong countries are favorable to us, we like them better, we want to work with them. And they should have more prerogatives

in their own region. So for the United States, we should have special prerogatives in the Western Hemisphere, including apparently, choosing who governs certain countries, and we just saw what happened in Venezuela. But it also, I think, and most concerningly, suggests that they're going to give special deference to Russia when it comes to Europe, as you just said.

They're negotiating right now. They're trying to end the Russia-Ukraine war, which I think is a good thing, by the way, to be negotiating. But a bad thing if what they're going to do is ultimately defer to what Russia says it needs And then when it comes to the indo-pacific or asia, uh, china has strong views about how that region should be organized and the united states Has always uh stood by our allies and our partners in that region Uh through deterrence to try to prevent china from its imposing its will and it seems like this administration

Uh is is at least implying that it will take a different approach. And so I think if you are US allies in Europe, US allies in Asia, you're quite concerned by this entire approach and this entire worldview. And if you are in the Western hemisphere, you gotta get buckled up for what could be

even more US intervention than we've already seen. Why don't we take the regions and let's go one by one and let's go kind of Western hemisphere. I mean, obviously in the Biden administration, if you wanted to, it wasn't a surprise that the American military might was strong enough. If you wanted to assert yourself and invade of Venezuela or make these threats, like you could do it. But I've always thought that part of power is restraint and that actions have consequences.

What you do in Venezuela, in addition to infringing on sovereignty and a world order, and which let's be very clear about, in areas that Trump seems to ignore the sovereignty part and just say, hey, Canada, 51st state, hey, Greenland, we don't care about that. But then there are consequences, too, that you have to think about. Well, how is that going to impact other regions? So describe a doctrine of power with restraint and why it's wielded and not wielded in certain areas.

Yeah, look, there's a, let's start from a perspective of something at least I agree with the Trump administration on, I suspect you do too, I won't speak for you, which is that the Maduro government is a terrible government. Maduro himself is a horrible authoritarian dictator who, you know, no one has any love lost for, any tears shed about the fact that he's no longer governing Venezuela. That is fundamentally a good thing.

But the key point is the one that you made. There are a lot of bad people around the world, a lot of bad governments around the world. And the United States is a very powerful country, and at least in theory, has the ability to go in and disrupt any number of these governments, go and grab criminals in any number of places.

There are good reasons why we don't just go around the world doing that. One is my view, and I began my career as a journalist covering the US invasion of Iraq, which started, by the way, as a relatively easy intervention, the initial invasion to topple the Saddam Hussein regime, and quickly spiraled totally out of control at enormous cost to the United States in terms of number of service members we lost, economic cost, and our standing in the world.

And what I guess I'm getting at is that war should be necessary. If you're going to use this tool of a policy which has a lot of risk associated with it and a lot of risk that you start with some limited mission, grab Maduro, bring him to US court, subject him to justice, next thing you know you're threatening the new leader of Venezuela, which Trump has already done, and threatening to go back into Venezuela, maybe with boots on the ground, and then coming out and saying, actually, it's not the new leadership of Venezuela

that's in charge. The United States is in charge and might actually be in charge for several years to come. And whether or not Americans think that it's a good thing that Maduro is gone, as I said, I believe it's a good thing that he's gone.

The notion of the United States governing Venezuela for the next several years, given all of the challenges we have at home and the Trump administration shifting its attention, getting distracted by this adventure, which did not pose a direct threat in a serious way to the United States that warrants a military intervention, I think is going to age very badly over time.

Because you still essentially have the Maduro regime in place in Venezuela. I mean, it's not Maduro, but you've got Delcy Rodriguez. She's now been sworn in, might I add, with the ambassador of Russia and the ambassador of China giving her hugs along with the ambassador of Iran. I mean, that wasn't a signal.

I don't know what else is. And then you have Diodatos Kabeo, the enforcer, the interior minister there who's still out there running the collectivos who are repressing people on the streets of Venezuela. And Lavrov and RT and Sputnik and all the Russian media,

they seem to still be saying, we got a pretty good relationship, you know, with this government. And Donald Trump saying the oil companies love this. And the oil companies are saying, actually we need a hundred billion dollars in subsidies

if you want us there, because you know that oil, it's a little muddy and we have to refine it and we don't feel comfortable doing it on our own. So, and then Trump's bringing Machado over in the weekend where he's gonna be saying, give me the Nobel peace prize. And I, so it seems already to your point, you look at all those factors and it's like, did you think about these things?

Like, what are you doing?

Yeah, look, I think that Saturday press conference on the day that this operation was conducted, and by the way, this operation, they should get some credit for the extraordinary skill of the execution of this operation. And by they, I really mean the US military.

I got to see up close how many difficult things the US government asks our military to do and how extraordinarily they perform almost 100% of the time. And that includes in this case, where by all accounts, they took no serious casualties and executed this mission.

But in that press conference, where Trump could have described this as a very limited mission, very successful operation, we got this bad guy. We're going to put him on trial. And now, you know, I want the Venezuelan people to decide their future. He made two, I think, just critical mistakes.

And it's not clear that these were planned. He may have just said these things, which happens, obviously, with him sometimes. One is that when he was asked about the democratically elected leaders of Venezuela in an election that took place during the Biden administration, 2024, which we believe was won very clearly, maybe two to one by the Venezuelan opposition,

a candidate named Edmundo Gonzalez, who was sort of the handpicked ally of Maria Carina Machado. He said, Gonzalez, Machado, man, they don't have a lot of support inside Venezuela. So I'm not sure we wanna turn the country over to them.

And then he made this comment that I think is going to live in infamy about the United States now running the show in Venezuela. So whether that was intentional, whether that was kind of an ad lib, they now kind of own that approach. And other administration people have tried to back away from it and say, actually, you know, we're going to do this a different way.

But every time he's asked, he sort of doubles down on what I think are these two critical mistakes that are going to define this operation for the foreseeable future.

Let's talk about Asia. You know, the Biden administration did a lot to work multilaterally, trilaterally. I mean, the famous photo of Biden next to South Korea, Japan, you know, all together, you know, bringing people together in Asia. It was a pivot to Asia famously

is what Obama said as well. And now when the president of Taiwan asks to use US airspace and Xi Jinping calls Donald Trump and says, don't do that. Donald Trump doesn't even let the president of Taiwan use the US airspace and Xi Jinping calls Donald Trump and says, don't do that. Donald Trump doesn't even let the president of Taiwan use the US airspace.

Now, after Takeishi, the prime minister of Japan was pushing back on Trump for not having her back after she supported Taiwan and then Xi Jinping said, or the Chinese government said, well, we're gonna behead you and kill you. Like the US seemed to symbolically fly an airplane in the region to say, ah, we're doing this.

They did that, but it just seems if you're in Asia right now, you're seeing the sphere of influence discussion. I think you're realizing, and this is why Japan's doing a military buildup, South Korea also, the US doesn't have our back. So to me, fundamentally, the Asia policy has shifted. Xi Jinping sees it. He's been, I think, just outmaneuvering Donald Trump on trade like crazy. And it's not like Xi Jinping

didn't try to do the things with rare earth restrictions and soybean stuff with Biden, but Biden checked it, you checked it by doing alliances in Asia to say we've got allies. And I think that now China says we don't have allies. What say you about Asia?

Well, so I think in some ways the Biden administration and the Trump administration have a similar objective, strategic objective in Asia, at least one, which is that for the United States and China to go to war with each other would be a disaster, a disaster for both countries, a disaster for the region,

a disaster for the world, given the economic cost of a conflict between these two massive, I mean, the two world's largest economies. But our approach to avoiding that conflict was through deterrence and through building up our alliances and our partnerships in that region, strengthening our relationship with the Koreans, strengthening our relationship with the Japanese, strengthening their relationship

with each other, as you said, and then strengthening our relationship with countries in the region that sometimes are considered almost swing voters. Sometimes they're a little more in the direction of China. Sometimes they're a little more in the direction of the United States, countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, where after four years, we were in a much stronger position than we were when, when we started. The Trump administration's approach to this region, uh,

it with the same goal maybe of, of avoiding conflict with China is to cozy up to the Chinese, figure out what concessions have to be made to keep that relationship stable. And they've made enormous concessions just in recent months, in particular when it comes to export controls placed on advanced semiconductors, which you alluded to. In return, by the way, for very little from China.

China has agreed for a year to license, to sell to the United States and other countries the rare earths that are one of the foundational building blocks of our advanced technology economy, but for a year, and then we'll see. But the Trump administration's approach to avoiding a conflict with China seems to be tell our allies, don't be too provocative. Taiwan, don't be too provocative.

Japan, as you said, don't be too provocative. Taiwan, don't be too provocative. Japan, as you said, don't be too provocative. And China, let's negotiate, let's talk. And I think one thing to look for over the course of the rest of this year is there are going to be several consequential meetings between President Trump and Xi Jinping.

There'll be one in the United States, there'll be one in Beijing, there'll be a couple others at big multilateral events. And at every one of these gatherings, the Trump administration seems to want to put new things on the table for China just to keep the relationship in a relatively calm and stable, low-temperature place. And these concessions do not seem to be getting enough benefit for us, for the American people.

And I think those of us who watch Asia closely are worried about that. You know, also they'll announce these trade deals but then we'll never see the document about what the deal entails. And it's a handshake and Trump will always say, here's what I've got. But we never hear China say anything.

You know, they just go kind of silent and they'll use these broader platitudes of cooperation and equal respect and dignity, but they never say, yeah, that's our deal. And then it's like, well, they don't buy the soybeans that Trump said they were going to buy. The rare earth element deal, to your point, seems like a limited licensing deal, but then

it also has restrictions. China's discretion, if you have some military connection that therefore you, they could just turn it back on. So there's like that aspect of it. Like, so I don't, I mean, in a normal sense though, like Biden didn't run around announcing,

I've done this deal and it doesn't mean he didn't do deals. It was just like, talk to us about that aspect of it though, because like, isn't being careful with words here like Important and when Trump says these things that don't happen Like don't doesn't like China and other countries like they know

That now they're dealing with a foolish person who just wants to make PR statements and not do the things

So it's a really good insight And I think this is actually a tactic that they have honed that they believe works for them in spite of the criticism that you just described, which I fully agree with. And the tactic is basically make an announcement, grab a near term headline or chyron on cable, claim a big victory of some kind.

And then if and as that unravels over time or doesn't quite pan out exactly the way the president or the administration has described, people's attention has that by that point sort of moved on and nobody is really going to kind of hold them to what they've claimed.

And people try, people make an effort to do that. But I actually think unfortunately in terms of public consumption, Trump is somewhat right about the attention span of the world population, the American people. And sometimes these headlines do land relatively positively.

And I think his theory is, if this bill comes due sometime down the road, you know, people will have forgotten what I promised, or this could be on some other president's tab, not my tab. And so that would be their problem to square up with what the United States said it got. And meantime, I've already got what I wanted, which is this little incremental bump, bounce,

dopamine hit of good press. And they seem to be doing that over and over and over again, even if the long-term strategic impact of what they're announcing and what they're doing is actually detrimental to the country. We didn't operate that way. We didn't think it was responsible to operate that way. I can't quite claim that it's ineffective to operate that way because maybe to some extent it works

for them, although it shouldn't. I think the point you make though is as leaders, the Biden administration said, you know what, if we could grab a headline every day and declare a victory and use the red, white and blue to say, look what we did today and just make up stuff

even if it wasn't solidified. But I think what you're saying is we believed as leaders with global responsibilities and a generational outlook about this country, not just will we win a headline tomorrow there was actually decisions that are made that this is not how leaders need to behave in geopolitics

where we could be fracturing a global order that leads to our children and grandchildren living in a much worse off world than we have. Right? I mean, that's like, that's the thinking and then the counterpoint to that is the Trump way, which is dominate the immediate headline and don't care about the future, and then pass it on to whoever and good

luck with it. And then and then blame them for the future and then pass it on to whoever and good luck with it. And then blame them for the problem and say that you rebuilt the military and fixed everything.

I mean, it's a different approach to leadership.

Yeah, and the best example of this to me is every time they use a number in terms of what they have been able to extract or extort from another country to invest United States. It's like some random number of billions or trillions or gazillions or whatever it is. And it's different almost every time. It's almost entirely unverifiable.

Often it does end up in a headline because the president said it. So in theory, it's news or has at least a degree of credibility credibility even though it shouldn't just because it comes out of his mouth and Whether this any of this actually materializes over time I think is a not just an open question, but but pretty unlikely in in in some cases and they run this play uh again and again and again and I think back to

When I was in government and my former colleagues how like rigorously and carefully we tried to scrutinize everything that came out of the president's mouth. Everything we put in a fact sheet should be an actual fact, not something we would like to be true or we would like to press to report and never verify. And it does not feel like there is anything

approaching that process going on right now with the public utterances of this administration. The oil thing, when it comes to Venezuela, is another great example. Oh, the oil companies are dying to go in and get access to these resources except, well, maybe we now have to subsidize them to do that. And today, you know, they're in Washington, probably telling the administration behind closed doors,

there's a lot of risk here. And we're not going to rush in without a lot more assurances that this is going to be actually an economically viable proposition for us.

And you know how you're trying to shake down Canada? Well, you may now have made the number one client of Canadian oil, China. And China's going to come in and now buy there instead of Venezuela. And yes, it may be a little pricier,

but it may actually be a more stable market from China. And now Canada may say, you know what, let's have a broader cooperation with China. Maybe we bring in your EVs. And now the US is cutting it. So every action has these consequences and dominoes that we're seeing, which is why you plan these things out. Let's just go to Europe though for a moment, which is, obviously the biggest issue, being Donald Trump's promise on day one

that he would bring peace in Ukraine. And then you had Keith Kellogg, who I always thought was never gonna last long there based on his support of Ukraine. He lasted frankly longer than I thought he would be, but he got demoted from the envoy of Russia

to the envoy to Ukraine pretty quickly when Putin said, I don't like this guy. But it's been constant, you know, Trump saying that there's progress, Zelensky, I think, you know, just trying to survive. And then when I've heard everything from Dmitryev

and Lavrov and anything that's been said from Russia, they've always said the special operation never ends until we fully destroy Ukraine. We're gonna wipe, like they've never once to me have said a single thing that resembles we wanna deal like ever, artificial state, da da da da.

So talk to us about Europe. And I think that does bleed also in to a little bit in the Middle East

because there's a lot of conflagration in the whole area. So Europe to me is the region of the world that has in some ways, the most reason to be hopeful but also the most perilous in the current moment. I'll start with the positive because I almost never get to talk about anything positive

when I answer questions about the world. Look, the Europeans, when Trump came in, I think knew they were not going to be dealing with a close ally anymore. And they had some options as to how to deal with that. They could have decided they are just going to follow Trump

down the far right rabbit hole. And there've been a number of elections in Europe since Trump came to power where there were far right candidates who Trump supported, who were aligned with his worldview, who were defeated, thankfully, by European voters. So they had that option. And for now, they have turned against it.

They also had the option, I think, if they were not going to be aligned with the United States, to hedge and maybe move in the direction of other big, powerful countries. Maybe like Russia and start to think, oh, we have to compromise on support for Ukraine or on buying Russian energy.

Maybe even with China. We can't afford to have the same national security concerns about cooperating with China economically or on technology if we can't cooperate as closely with the United States, and they have not gone down those paths either. They have chosen the third option, which is to try to stand up on their own two feet, be a separate power center in the world that maintains

sort of fidelity to their values, and to try to build their power by spending real money for the first time maybe in their modern history on defense and the things that they're going to need to be a sort of more independent region of the world. So that's a good thing that Europe has done that. The perilous part of this is that the Trump administration has pretty clearly decided that they have more or less given up on our traditional allies in Europe.

They have this inexplicable, and I genuinely can't explain it. There are all kinds of conspiracy theories that I can't verify or validate, but they have this inexplicable fondness, at least the president does, for Russia and desire to have a better relationship with Russia, which by the way, has about a $2 trillion economy. The European zone has about an $18 to $20 trillion economy. So why we would want to trade the big one for the small one, I can't argue

for. But they want that. They want this better relationship and they see the end of the Ukraine war as a necessary step to having a better relationship with Russia. And their way of going about ending the Ukraine war is exactly the opposite of what would be just and right. It is instead of putting pressure on Russia to make the compromises necessary for a just end to the war that Ukraine can live with, they have decided they need to put their pressure on Ukraine to make massive compromises to mollify

Russia. But the punchline is really where you started, which is even in spite of that, they cannot get Russia to say yes to wanting to end the war, because it is quite clear, as you laid out, that Vladimir Putin does not want that. So my expectation is, as bad as it is that they are putting so much pressure on Ukraine to essentially capitulate to Russia,

Russia may ultimately end up saving us from ourselves, Ukraine, from Trump by saying, we're not ready to end the war. Now, the bad part about that is this war may continue for some time until the US wises up and realizes that the only way to end it is to put enough pressure on Russia to do a just deal. Right. And as Zelensky just tries to buy time, what he's also buying time for is now to your point, Europe is now

investing in its own military. And they're building up with a war posture and a war footing that I think and you can tell me if you think I'm being hyperbolic, but the way this seems to be ramping up is like a, again, I don't want to use like World War, this world, right? It's just it, I'll just say, Oh, imminent war footing

buildup that I think you see in Europe, and a less reliance and a pushing away from the US. I mean, obviously, the F 35s are a superior jet than the gripe ins in Sweden. But are you going to buy an F 35? If the US is going to blackmail you? Are you going to buy from, you know, are you going to buy the French weapons?

You have to make these calls now that obviously before you'd buy the American weapons and now you'd be like, ah, but what if he does something to us? And then we have to get the servicing done by American companies. And what if he says no? So there's some of that.

Anyway, let me give you the kind of final word

as we tie this all together of where we are right now.

Yeah, so 2026 is off to a roaring start. And to be honest, I think this is going to be a very fateful year. It's gonna be a very fateful year in the world because we are rapidly pushing towards a kind of inflection point, I think, in Europe on the Russia-Ukraine war, as we've been discussing.

In Asia, it's going to be a very fateful year because it is quite clear that President Trump is seeking a grand bargain, a big deal that tries to resolve all the outstanding issues with China. And the big question is, at whose cost? At the cost of U.S. competitiveness when it comes to sensitive technologies and the technologies that are going to define the future like AI, at the cost of our allies and their ability to deter Chinese aggression, all of that seems also likely to come to a head. We've got the Venezuela situation and how that continues to evolve and maybe deepen

the U. the US role. And the amazing thing about all of this is all of this is our crises that the United States has more or less generated and manufactured through American policy. The world has a tendency to throw challenges at you that you do not expect. We got two big ones during the course of the Biden administration with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the October 7th attack by Hamas against Israel and the war that unfolded after

that. We haven't even gotten yet in the Trump administration a big exogenous crisis that the world has thrown at them that they then have to deal with and manage. And at a certain point, there's just so much going on in the world that that is bound to happen. 2016 might be the year for that too. And as they're trying to deal with all these things that they have manufactured,

their capacity to deal with some big new crisis is something that gives me a lot of concern and keeps me up at night. So those are the things I'm going to be watching for. more optimistic about all this, but I think we're in for a bumpy, bumpy ride throughout the course of the rest of this year. Well, and I think the way that we understand those bumps is having conversations like this, because the bumps usually don't just bump up. I mean, there are predicate factors. And I think when you understand from a global perspective, just what's happening,

there's at least a way to address this and understand this. And you don't really hear many conversations like this. So John Feiner, White House Deputy National Secretary, Advisor under the Biden administration and Chief of Staff to John Kerry under the Obama administration, former Secretary of State.

We appreciate you, John.

Thanks, Ben.

Great to be with you.

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