John Mearsheimer BREAKS DOWN Trump Putin Summit

All right hello everybody happy saturday it is ryan and i hear to break down the everything that's gone on in the news and you may have noticed that we actually have a very special gas were very honored to be joined by professor john mir shimer the university of chicago an intellectual hero of mine and a great friend of the show sir thank you so much for joining us really appreciate it. Thank you for having me. It's my pleasure to be here with you and Ryan. Absolutely, sir. So we are going to go through with you everything that happened yesterday at the Trump Putin summit as well as some of the information that is now coming out as a result. So just for everybody purposes, we're recording this around 9 a.m.

Eastern Time. Things could obviously change with the diplomatic situation, but this is generally where things stand as of right now. So Griffin, could we go ahead and start to kind of the show of the summit where Trump made a big, you know, a grand gesture at the in Alaska at that summit, greeting Putin with the red carpet lined with US fighter jets. He flew a B-2 bomber escort over Putin's head as a show of tremendous military might. That seemed to kind of be the tone that Trump wanted to set a reminder to Putin, quote, whose boss, but things very quickly changed

from there. Professor, what we started to see was a nearly three-hour, three-on-three meeting between Donald Trump, Secretary Rubio, Steve Whitkoff, two of Putin's advisors and their translators. There was a scheduled lunch, which they eventually missed, and they announced in a flurry of changes a press conference. At that press conference, it really isn't even fair to call it a press conference is more of a press announcement lasted about 12 minutes.

Putin actually spoke first. So Griffin, let's go ahead and take a listen to Putin. What he had to say specifically his framing of an agreement that they had had the Trump later rejects, but the contours of what the setting piece is for what follows after the summit. Griffin, let's go ahead and take a listen, please.

I expect that today's agreements will be the starting point, not only for the solution of the Ukrainian issue, but also will help us bring back businesslike and pragmatic relations between Russia and the US. And in the end, I would like to add one more thing. I'd like to remind you that in 2022, during the last contact with the previous administration, I tried to convince my previous American colleague that the situation should not be brought to

the point of no return when it would come to hostilities.

So Professor, he initially framed things as an agreement, but the real top line was that there was no ceasefire that was announced. And it appears that he rejected the European, Ukrainian and US position for an immediate ceasefire, just broadly having watched Putin's full eight-minute statement and everything, as well as some of the positions that the United States tried to force onto Putin in the head of this summit. What's your reaction so far just to Putin, the way that he handled himself

there with Donald Trump, and what does it tell us about the broader situation? Well, I think that Putin obviously did a brilliant job of handling himself in yesterday's meeting. There's just no question about that. And that's really all he had to do was come and look diplomatic, look smart, look respectful of President Trump. Uh, and it would do a great deal to put an end to his isolation in the West and give him real legitimacy. And he came in and as I think almost everybody expected, he did the job.

And, uh, he was very effective in that way. And then there's the whole question of the ceasefire which you raise just for the audience's purposes. Clarification for the audience it's important to understand that there's a difference between a peace agreement and a ceasefire. And really what the russians want is not a ceasefire because they're winning on the battlefield. What they want is a peace agreement. And what the West wants and the Ukrainians want is a ceasefire.

And Trump tried to convince Putin that what we need here is a ceasefire. And what resulted is that Putin said said there will be no ceasefire. We have to have a peace agreement. And in fact, Trump has now backed off from demanding a ceasefire. And he said to someone after the meeting that the best solution to this problem is to go directly to a peace agreement.

In other words, putting the ceasefire that the Ukrainians and the Europeans and many people in the United States want aside. He's saying that's a non-starter after having talked to Putin. So I think in terms of the clip that you just showed, that's the most important subjunctive point.

And can you unpack for people why Ukraine would be reluctant to reach a peace agreement

versus an immediate ceasefire? What is Ukraine is losing on the battlefield and the West cannot do much to help it at this point in time. So if you can create a ceasefire, put an end to the fighting on the battlefield, that gives the Ukrainians a respite, number one. And number two, it allows them to get more arms from the West to build up their forces and then put up a better fight against the Russians moving forward once the fighting restarts. In other words, once the ceasefire ends. But the Russians are not dumkhoffs, and they understand

if they're winning, it would be nuts, to put it bluntly, for them to stop the war when they're winning, allow the Ukrainians to recover, and then fight more effectively at some point down the road. So the Russians have no interest in a ceasefire. Ukraine and the West really like the idea. What the Russians want is they want a peace agreement. They want to settle this one, but they want to settle it on their terms. It's very important to understand this.

The Russians view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat. This war for them is existential, and they have a set of demands that they will not compromise on your three principal demands. One is that you crank in the west recognize that russia has a next those four o'clock. That they now partially occupy for a Oblast in Ukraine plus Crimea. That's demand number one. Demand number two is that Ukraine be a neutral state.

That means it can't be a NATO and there can't be Western security guarantees, especially a security guarantee from the United States. Ukraine, from the Russian perspective, has to be neutral. Third demand is that Ukraine has to disarm, not completely, but disarm to the point where it has no offensive military capability, i.e. it can't threaten Russia. Now, these are three harsh demands from the Ukrainian point of view and from the West point of view.

These are unacceptable demands to the Ukrainians and to most people in the West. And this is why you can't get a peace agreement. So what we have here is the Russians want a peace agreement. The Ukrainians in the West have no interest in a peace agreement. The West and the Ukrainians want a ceasefire and the Russians have no interest in a ceasefire. And the end result is you have a very short meeting and you have no agreement.

Very well said, sir. Let's go ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump because with that context, everything that he says begins to make no sense. There's no deal until there's a deal. I need to get on the phone with NATO and with Ukraine, which has now happened and we're gonna give everybody the results. But it's still actually really the framework that I want people to go into with the Trump press conference. Again, press announcement is I have never known this man not to take

an extraordinary amount of questions, even in the Helsinki summit of 2018. It's three minutes roughly that he speaks. It's clear that he is incredibly muted, both emotionally, you know, after his meeting with Putin. And I think what he's realizing in real time is the mistake, you know, that he made in agreeing to these European and Ukrainian quote red lines going into the summit itself and starting to understand the exact puzzle that you just laid out. So with that guys, let's go ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump and what he had to

say.

We've made some headway, so there's no deal until there's a deal. I will call up NATO in a little while. I will call up the various people that I think are appropriate, and I'll, of course, call up President Zelensky and tell him about today's meeting. It's ultimately up to them. They're going to have to agree with what Marco and Steve and some of the great people from the Trump administration who have come here – Scott and John Bradley, thank you very much.

Some of our really great leaders, they've been doing a phenomenal job. We also have some tremendous Russian business representatives here, and I think everybody wants to deal with us. We've become the hottest country anywhere in the world in a very short period of time, and we look forward to that. We look forward to dealing with that,

try and get this over with. We really made some great progress today. I've always had a fantastic relationship with President Putin, with Vladimir. We had many, many tough meetings, good meetings.

We were interfered with by the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax.

All right, Griffin, you can go ahead and come out of this because that's effectively everything that we do need to know, which is, he said, there's no deal until there's a deal, I need to get on the phone with the Ukrainians and the Europeans. And now, professor, we actually do have the result of that. Can we go ahead and put Donald Trump's truth, please, up on the screen? Because this lays out exactly what you said. And I can go ahead and read from it. It says,

a great and very successful day in Alaska. The meeting with President Putin went very well, as did a late night phone call. But he says, quote, it was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement which would end the war and not a mere ceasefire agreement, which often does not hold up. President Zelensky will be coming to DC, the Oval Office, on Monday afternoon. If it all works out, we will then schedule a meeting with President Putin.

Immediately, sir, we also got Zelensky's reaction and kind of the laying out of where I think things are going to trip up. So let's go ahead and put that up there as well, because it's very similar to the ceasefire demand that was made initially. He says killings must stop as soon as possible. The fire must cease both on the battlefield and in the sky, as well as our port infrastructure. All Ukrainian POWs and civilians must be released. Pressure must be maintained with the aggression and occupation. In my conversation with President Trump, I said that sanctions could be strengthened if

there's no trilateral meeting with Russia. Sanctions are an effective tool. And then security must be guaranteed reliably and in the long term with the involvement of both the Europe and the US. All important to Ukraine must be discussed with Ukraine's participation. So it appears, you know, given the context, sir, of everything that you've laid out here,

that we see that Trump is now dropping the initial ceasefire demand, which effectively, as you said, wouldn't make a lot of battlefield sense for Russia. But on the peace agreement terms, he's accepting this European or at the very least, the European and the Ukrainians are effectively demanding the same ceasefire that Putin just rejected, as well as a laundry list of other things that are unacceptable to the Russians. So how do you expect then the Monday meeting to go with President Zelensky in the Oval Office?

Well, I think there's one very important dimension to what Trump said that we don't want to lose sight of. And that is, I think he's passing the torch to Zelensky. I think in a very important way, Trump has come to understand that he can't settle this one. There's no way he can agree, Trump, to a peace agreement and convince the Ukrainians, the Europeans and the Western foreign policy establishment that that's the smart thing to do.

Right.

And he can't convince Putin to agree to a ceasefire. So what can Trump do? And of course, what Zelensky says he should do is put secondary sanctions on Russia. We can talk about that because this meeting was in good part about secondary sanctions and Trump's interest in secondary sanctions in the past.

But Trump understands, he was asked afterwards what this means for secondary sanctions. There are going to be no secondary sanctions, at least at this point, says Trump. So the sanctions are off the table. The cease fire is off the table and Trump is basically agreed with Putin that you got to go directly. He said this, you got to go directly for peace agreement.

So Zelensky comes to the white house. What does this mean? He's basically saying, I believe that Zelensky comes to the White House. What does this mean? He's basically saying, I believe that Zelensky and the Europeans can now sit down with Putin and they can work this out. If they need me, I'll be there, but it's up to them. I'm not going to cut a deal and then try and force it down the throats of the Ukrainians

and the Europeans because they don't want to go along with me. So if you listen to the press conference, this is what you were playing. He said, it's ultimately up to them. He said he's going to call NATO. He's going to call the Ukrainians. But what happens is, and these were his words in the clip that you played, it is ultimately up to them. Very important words. Yes.

And I think Trump just understands he can't solve this one. And he's correct. He can't solve this one. He might have been able to solve it if he had been strategically smart from the get-go. But since he took office on January 20th up to now, he has behaved in a remarkably foolish and uninformed way in terms of dealing with the Russians.

What he finally figured out yesterday after talking to Putin, he should have figured out before he moved into the White House on January 20th. The Russians have had one position on this issue since at least last June 14th. Last June 14th, this is June 14th, 2024, right? Putin said very clearly what the Russian demands were. They were consistent with what he had said before June 14th, 2024, and he has not changed

those demands at all since June 14th, 2024. So why didn't Trump and company understand exactly what those demands were and work around that starting on January 20th? I don't know what the answer is, but they didn't. And the end result is he finally figured it out yesterday.

And so from your perspective, it was the Vladimir stop, we need to stop this on day one. That was all a mistake and he needed to understand that he had to approach this through the context of a broader peace agreement. Is that, is that what you would say was the mistake?

I think the fundamental mistake, Ryan, is that the vast majority of people in the foreign policy establishment refuse to accept the argument that the Russians see Ukraine in NATO as an existential threat. It's an existential threat for Putin and the people around him. And given that it's an existential threat, they are willing to fight a war, a major league war, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO or having security guarantees from the West.

We can't get it through our thick skulls here in the West that Russia views Ukraine and NATO as an existential threat. And we continue to play this game, or we have continued to play this game up until yesterday, where we thought that Ukraine could have security guarantees from the West, or maybe it could even join NATO, that Ukraine could get that territory back that it's lost, and so forth and so on.

We've been delusional up to now. And I believe that the Ukrainians and the Europeans and huge chunks of the national security establishment here in the United States will remain delusional until the situation on the battlefield makes it impossible to continue along that foolish path.

Right, it's very tragic, the result that you're laying out, but it's obviously the most likely. One of the things, sir, I want to talk about is the last grasp of the maximal pressurists is these secondary sanctions, because Russia is already the most sanctioned country in the world by the United States. And as Putin pointed out, actually, in his press conference, press conference he's like yeah our GDP is up by 20% you know like we're actually doing fine. Trump has tried his hands roughly at some sort of these secondary

sanctions with India but you know it's very interesting that the Indian government has not changed his position a single iota and in fact it was a talking point of the Western security establishment that the secondary sanctions on India were the reason that Putin agreed to this summit in the first place. There does not seem to be hard evidence of that, given now necessarily how the result of the peace talks happened, and especially because they didn't change their position.

But does that factor into how you say that the West has handled itself foolishly in believing that there's one more secret trick they might be able to pull to change the strategic calculus of the Russians?

Yes.

I mean, secondary sanctions are of enormous importance, and I believe this meeting was all about secondary sanctions. Now, you're saying to yourself, what exactly does John mean? You want to remember that Trump, in the weeks before this meeting, was threatening secondary sanctions on Russia. And what that means is that you're effectively not going to sanction Russia, because as you pointed out, the Russians are so sanctioned

at this point that there are no more direct sanctions you can put on the Russians that are meaningful. Secondary sanctions mean that you're going to put sanctions on India and China and a few other countries, but mainly India and China, if they continue to trade with Russia. In other words, if they continue to import Russian oil. Well, they're not going to work. We cannot put secondary sanctions on the Chinese. They have too much leverage over us because of rare earths and magnets.

And as you pointed out, the Indians have made it clear that secondary sanctions are not going to work with them. And if anything, it's going to drive the Indians closer to the Russians, which is completely counterproductive. So secondary sanctions don't work.

So what happened here was Trump got himself into a real pickle. He had promised that he was going to put secondary sanctions on the Russians by August 8th. So what does he do a few days before August 8th? He sends Steve Whitkoff off to Moscow to talk with Putin about having a meeting, the meeting that took place yesterday. So, if you have that meeting, then you don't have to put sanctions on the Russians, secondary sanctions which are again, effectively sanctions on India and China on August 8th.

What happens is Whitkoff goes, talks to Putin. Putin, of course, agrees to a meeting because a meeting is mana from heaven for Putin, for reasons we talked about at the start of the show. He agrees and Whitkoff comes back, tells Trump, Trump announces that they're going to have this meeting and he doesn't have to put secondary sanctions on the Russians on August 8th. He gets out of the pickle and it's this meeting yesterday that does the trick. So one could argue that the

meeting yesterday was in a way a victory for Trump because he got away from that promise. And furthermore, as we talked about before, it's very important to understand that he was asked after the meeting whether or not secondary sanctions would be put on the Russians. And he basically said that ship has sailed. So he has taken, at least up to now, you can never know for sure with Trump, but he has at least for now solved that big problem

that he had. All of this to say, guys, the fact is that we have no cards to play here.

Right. And he solved the problem, but as you pointed out, it was a problem of his own making. So with Ukraine coming next week, I want to ask you from Ukraine's perspective, and I'll put up, I think this is roughly a fairly recent sense of where the front lines are. You know, Ukraine still has access to the Black Sea along these, if these lines were frozen. From what I hear from Ukrainians, they say, okay, it's actually just going to give Russia a chance to regroup, and then they're going to attack again and completely

cut us off from the Black Sea. And we will just be, instead of a 80% rump of a country, we'll be a 40% rump of a country, land a 40% rump of a country landlocked and just a dual client of both Russia and the EU. So if you're the Ukrainians, what are you fighting for here and what's your best case scenario?

Well, I have been arguing for a long time, I think as you know, Ryan, that the best case from Ukraine's point of view is to settle this war immediately. Because as you point out, they're going to lose 20% if they agree to give up those four Oblasts plus Crimea. About 22% of pre-2014 Ukraine will be lost. Is this a tragedy for Ukraine? Absolutely. There's no question about it.

I fully understand why no Ukrainian would want to agree to give up 22% of the territory of the country. However, the question you always have to ask yourself as a good strategist is what is the alternative? And the alternative is to continue fighting. And as you pointed out, if you continue fighting, you're likely to lose probably about half the country.

Uh, you're likely to lose Odessa and that would be catastrophic. You're likely to lose Harkiv. You're likely to use a, lose a handful more Oblast as well. So you will end up in that scenario as a dysfunctional rump state. It seems to me the least bad alternative, and I'm choosing words carefully here, it's not a good alternative, it's the least bad alternative, is to cut a deal now and minimize

how much territory you lose and also minimize the number of Ukrainians who are going to die if you continue to fight on. The other thing is, if you continue to fight on and you continue to insist that you're going to be in NATO and you continue to insist that you need security guarantees from the West, and the West flirts with you about security guarantees. You just give the Russians greater incentives to take more territory and to

make you a truly dysfunctional rub state. What the Ukrainian should want to do. And I understand this as hard to swallow is to survive as a rump state, but not as a dysfunctional rump state, and try to come up with some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians, so that the Russians don't feel threatened, so that they're not bent on wrecking your country. This is the best alternative for the Ukrainians at this point of time. But getting that point through to Zelensky and company and to the Europeans especially,

but also to huge chunks of the American national security establishment is almost impossible to do.

It really is, sir. It's mystifying because it's like they live in an alternative reality where the status quo is somehow good for Ukraine. I mean, let's go ahead and put the battlefield reality tear sheet please up there on the screen. Literally days before, they made huge gains on the Ukrainian front line, one of the biggest breakthroughs by the Russians so far. They have a manpower advantage obviously. You know, the average age of the Ukrainian military, we still, you know, it remains unclear. And this is, my main question is about inside of Ukraine, because Zelensky is wedded to

this maximalist position, which again, we all emotionally understand. But the Ukrainian people, we recently had a poll on our show that we showed, had some, you know, a major support actually for some sort of negotiation. But there's no elections. And in fact, you know, he's been cracking down on domestic dissension from the beginning of the war, on top of recently signing this, you know, anti-corruption law, which drew

massive protests to the streets. So in that time, in this initial timeframe, it appears that the most likely scenario is Zelensky will reject outright some sort of meeting. Trump remains in his pickle about secondary sanctions, doesn't know what to do. The war will continue fighting on, at the very least with European support. Trump seems happy to send weapons to the Ukrainians as long as the Europeans buy them. And it'll be like some

sort of semi-frozen conflict where the front line moves daily. Now, how long does Ukraine, the polity, like the people left inside of Ukraine, tolerate that situation, as you said, as long as these thousands and thousands of their men, increasingly elder men, begin to keep dying on the battlefield?

It's very hard to answer that question. I mean, the only sort of analogous case that I know is Germany in World War I. And what happened is that the Americans entered the war in April of 1917. And, uh, what happened was that by the spring of 1918, the Americans were beginning to come in in huge numbers. And this meant that the balance of power on the battlefield in terms of manpower was shifting against the Germans. This is over the course of 1918. At the same time, what was happening in Germany is that support for the war on the home front was collapsing. And it was because of the blockade

that the West had put on Germany and on Austria-Hungary. Those countries were starving. It was a total disaster. So support for the war on the home front evaporated at the same time the coming of the Americans on the battlefield shifted the balance of power in ways that made it apparent that Germany was going to lose. And the end result is that by October 1918, Germany was through. It was all over with and you got a peace agreement. And you want to remember that the allies never set foot during the combat

on German territory. Germany collapsed on the home front. So just to go to Ukraine today, if you look at what's happening on the battlefield, it's very clear, and you were hinting at this, that Ukraine does not have enough manpower. They do not have enough infantry. And infantry is of enormous importance for parrying those Russian offensives. The Russians have a huge manpower advantage. Looks a lot like World War I in 1918 as the Americans come in. The balance of power on the ground is shifting.

And then if you look at what's happening on the home front, as you just described, support for the war is evaporating. Huge numbers of people have left or are leaving the country. Public opinion has turned against the war. So it does look like the situation is going to end in disaster for Ukraine. It's hard to imagine this going on for another year, given the balance of power and given public opinion at home. So all of this is to say the Ukrainians are doomed. And by the way, I think Trump and his advisors understand this,

and they are telling the Ukrainians and the Europeans, okay, you want to continue the fight, we'll give you the weaponry. As you pointed out, we're going to continue to give the Ukrainians the weapons, not directly, they're going to go through give the Ukrainians the weapons, not directly. They're going to go through the Europeans. The Europeans are going to pay for them.

But American weaponry will go to the Ukrainians. It won't be enough, but the real problem here is manpower. And so my view is that Ukraine is doomed, and Zelensky will soon figure that out and they'll have to reach some sort of accommodation with the Russians and you'll get a frozen peace.

Do you have a sense of where this goes from here? Like how much of the World War I analogy can you draw out? I mean, obviously, a post-war Ukraine would not have the kind of industrial capacity of a post-war, post-World War I Germany. And so even if it, if it's far right did feel that it was, quote unquote, stabbed in the back and forced into this bad agreement, it wouldn't really have the capacity to create some monster over the next 30 years. But what kind of knock-on effects could you expect from a piece of the kind you're talking about?

Yeah, this is a great question. I mean, you're absolutely right. Germany was a monster, right? You know, you went from 1914 to 1918, fighting that monster and defeating it and it involved the Russians, the French, the British, and then the Americans. It took four countries to take the Germans down. And the Germans' key ally was Austria-Hungary, which one could argue was an albatross around the Germans' neck. So Germany was very powerful. And when the war ended, the question

is, what do you do with that monster? And of course, again, we had World War II against that monster. Uh, and of course, again, we had world war two against that monster, uh, starting in 1939, but this is a completely different situation in that regard. The smart thing for the Ukrainians to do, as I said before, is

accept the fact that they've lost. Right. Try to settle it now and then work out a modus vivendi with the Russians. Do I think that's going to happen? No. And the reason is not simply the Ukrainians, right, who will have powerful incentives to want to get back that territory. It's also because the West, and this includes the United States, will not accept defeat. And we will go to great lengths, we in the West will go to great lengths to cause the Russians

trouble in those areas of Ukraine that they incorporate into Russia. And the Ukrainians will do the same. And the Russians, of course, will retaliate. And furthermore, you have all sorts of other potential flashpoints in Eastern Europe where trouble could start. Belarus, the Baltic, Arctic, Moldova, the Black Sea, and so forth and so on. The potential flashpoints are numerous, right? And the end result is I think you're going to have poisonous relations between the Russians on one side and the Ukrainians and the West on the other side for

as far as the eye can see. You're not going to have that modus vivendi that I was talking about. And again, I have to say, I do not understand why people cannot come to grips with the fact that settling this war and creating decent relations between Russia and Ukraine is in Ukraine's interest, right? It just boggles my mind that we can

see the end of the war. Is it ultimately because it's not up to Ukraine? Victoria Nuland said, you know, as I think Russia was launching its invasion, okay, if they succeed and go into Kiev, they can look forward to, you know, decades of guerrilla war inside Ukraine. And it wasn't as if this was a generous offer to Ukraine. This was a, we are going to seed this guerrilla war whether Ukraine likes it or not. So, maybe it's just as simple as if it was up to Ukraine, they would make a more strategic choice, but it or not. So maybe it's just as simple as if it was up to Ukraine, they

would make a more strategic choice, but it's not.

Well, you want to remember Ryan that immediately after the war started, Putin put out peace feelers to the Ukrainians to come to sort of come to some sort of peace agreement so that they could end the war then. Remember the war starts in February, 2022, and they're negotiating. This is the Ukrainians and the Russians are negotiating to end the war almost immediately after it starts the famous Istanbul negotiations, and they don't reach an agreement, but they're making major league progress towards

reaching an agreement. And what happens is that the Americans and the British, in the form of Boris Johnson, come in and tell the Ukrainians to walk away from the negotiations and to continue the war. So this supports your basic point

that we have been more enthusiastic about this war at different points than the Ukrainians have. And I think a lot of that has to do with the fact, and I think this reflects Victoria Nuland's thinking, that we don't have to do the fighting, we don't do the dying, and we can use the Ukrainians for that purpose. We can use the Ukrainians to bleed the Russians white. Russia is now a great power. This is a problem for us in their mind, and we have to weaken Russia. And Ukraine is the perfect

opportunity to do that. My last question for you, sir, concerns grand strategy. I've been inspired by your work intellectually and more. In this moment, I'm just shocked at, especially with a lot of the people in the Trump administration, I know them personally, I know you do as well, and we heard for years about the folly of being obsessed with the Middle East, of American security doctrine,

just having this religious devotion to NATO, to Europe, to the Middle East. And as I watch the consumption of US weaponry of US attention and diplomacy on Israel, on, you know, an obsession really with Israel, and then also similar session here with Ukraine, and then even, you know, determining our relationship with India and with China, on the basis of Ukraine, it just seems so counter to any grand strategic interests of the United States and of Asia, which will

compromise some 50% GDP, you know, in the next couple of years. So just at a very, you know, 50,000 foot level, does this just confirm really, that not only will we have the 2020s be a Chinese decade, but of one where, you know, the US really is just choosing the last bastions of this Cold War and 1990s mentality.

And when we had the opportunity, which it seems to be right now, we just decided not

to take it.

Yeah, I think that's an accurate description of what's happened here. The Trump administration and the Biden administration both argue that the principal contingency the united states should concern itself with. Is war against china and east asia and their principal goal should be to contain china and east asia. That was the consensus opinion inside both administrations but what's happened is that we can't get out of Ukraine. We're pinned down in Ukraine. And the situation in the Middle East is even worse. If you look at what happened in the war that we picked with the Houthis. Remember, Trump said we're going to go out and beat the Houthis.

And after about a month, Trump said, we're quitting this war. Those Houthis are mighty formidable. But of course, the real reason that we quit the war was that we were running through our inventories of weapons at record pace. And our inventories are not very deep.

And then we get in the wars that Israel get involved in the wars that Israel is fighting, especially their war with Iran. And there again, we're using up all sorts of American weaponry and, and, and we're pinned down in the Middle East, right? Uh, the Biden administration at least had the good sense not to get sucked into a war with Iran. The Israelis, of course, were not to get sucked into a war with Iran.

The Israelis of course, were trying to suck us into a war with Iran in 2024, but the Biden administration, which did few smart things strategically, at least in this case, avoided a war in Iran. But Trump foolishly on June 22nd of this year, decided to go to war against Iran. So we're stuck in that situation now. And the question is, how do we get out? So I think from a strategic point of view, what's going on with regard to Ukraine and what is going on with regard to the Middle East is disastrous. And then there's the moral dimension. We don't want to lose

sight of the fact that the United States is complicit in a genocide in the Middle East, that what is happening in Gaza is a genocide. And for those people who don't want to call it a genocide, I would think you would at least have to acknowledge that this is mass murder on a scale that we haven't seen in a long time. And certainly it is mass murder on a scale that we haven't seen in a long time. And certainly it's mass murder on a scale we would never accept or should never accept from a close ally.

But nevertheless, here we are supporting Israel, hook, line, and sinker as it executes a genocide. So from both a strategic point of view and a moral point of view, when you look at the behavior of the Biden administration and now the Trump administration, it leaves me at least with a sick feeling in my stomach.

Ian I couldn't agree with you more, sir. It's always just such an honor to talk to you. So thank you so much for joining us and giving us your time to break down this summit. Dr. John SantaLucia Thank you very much to the two of you for

having me on, asking excellent questions and letting me give these lengthy answers.

Dr. Justin Marchegiani Well, that's what we will– you always have a platform here to do so. So we look forward to seeing you again next time. Dr. John SantaLucia Likewise. All right, we're gonna go to the second half of our show now, which is available to premium subscribers. I hope you guys enjoyed that. And if you wanna be able to watch things like that, as well as AMA on our Friday shows, breakingpoints.com, you can become one today. Let's get to it.

Hey, if you liked that video, hit the like button or leave a comment below. hit the like button or leave a comment below. It really helps get the show to more people.