Ukraine’s ‘iconic’ new army chief & the tank incident that made him a hero | War latest news update

I'm Francis Dernley, and this is Ukraine, the Latest.Today, in another historic day for the war, Commander -in -Chief Sierski is removed from office, replaced with one of the most famous commanders in the conflict.We bring together a frontline Ukrainian drone pilot and two leading experts to hear what really happened in the past 72 hours, what it means for the conflict, and the likely strategy Kyiv will adopt as the war enters its next phase.It's Wednesday, the 22nd of July, four years and 148 days since the full -scale invasion began.Today, I'm joined by regular contributor on the podcast, Dr. Jayde McGlynn of the War Studies Department at King's College London, Dr. Jack Watling, Senior Research Fellow for Applied Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, and Dimko Zlutenko, best known as a drone pilot in the 413th Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces.But first, the updates.

Well, It's happened.Following six days of protests, President Zelensky has announced his decision to dismiss Oleksandr Sersky as Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, formally appointing Mikhailo Drapati to replace him.Before we give you some more background on Drapati, I think it's worth reading some extracts from Sersky's resignation statement.I took command of the army in February 2024 at a very difficult time.The defence of Avdivka continued.Our units were semi -encircled.

One of my first orders was to order an organised withdrawal from the city.I made it because for me there was only one main priority, saving people's lives.And then there was a year that changed the course of this war.Together, we stopped the enemy's offensive in the Kharkiv region, we prevented his offensive in the Sumy region, and we conducted the Kursk operation.For the first time in this war, we transferred combat operations to the enemy's territory.We trained the army not only on the battlefield but also at its core.

We were the firstin the world to create a separate branch of the Army, the Unmanned Systems Forces.We have closed the Black Sea port in Novorossiysk.We are systematically destroying the enemy's shadow fleet.We have transferred the Army to a core structure, brought combat officers to headquarters and made it a rule.The path to leadership positions lies through the front.

We continue to restrain the enemy's offensive in the main directions and conduct offensive operations in certain sectors of the front.I have no right to speak about some of the operations we've implemented over the years.History will tell about them.I will only say the enemy remembered them.This year, 700 square kilometres of our land has been liberated under my command.The army, which two years ago was conducting a difficult defence, is advancing today.

I'm handing over to my successor an army that is not only holding the defence, but also in a state of offence, with initiative, with structure, with people who know how to beat the enemy.And I sincerely hope that this offensive will be continued.I thank every soldier, sergeant and officer with whom I have spent these years.I bow to the families of our fallen.His successor, Drapaty, paid tribute to Tsirsky, saying he was grateful for his consistent work in strengthening the Ukrainian army.I grew up in it, he said.

I will work responsibly, focused and with respect for the people who are defending our state today.Glory to the nation, death to the enemies.Jabhati is an ally of the SAC Defence Minister Fedorov, and more on that in a moment.But first, who is he?As mentioned yesterday, he was previously in charge of Ukraine's Ground Forces and Joint Forces Command, but is one of Ukraine's most famous battlefield commanders, made legendary for being the one steering the BMP -2 that broke through Russian -backed barricades in Mariupol in 2014 when Russian -backed militantswere attempting to seize control of the city.

He led the armoured breakthrough that helped Ukrainian forces regain the initiative and prevent that city from falling, a defining symbol of Ukraine's resistance in the early stages of the war before the full -scale invasion.He's now 43 and trained as a tank officer and accumulated 26 years of army experience.After the invasion, he built a reputation as the trusted commander sent to manage some of Ukraine's most desperate battles.He helped to stall the Russian advance in Krivyi Rih, Mr. Zelensky's hometown, and was one of the commanders of the counter -offensive that liberated Kherson, the only regional capital captured by Moscow's forces during the full -scale war.He also halted the Russian incursion near Kharkiv in the summer of 2024, soon after being appointed the youngest ever commander of the Ukrainian land forces, one of the senior positions in the military.But his tenure, as you may recall if you've been with us for this long, was short.

When Russia struck an army training centre in June last year, killing at least 12 and wounding dozens of Ukrainian soldiers, he resigned, saying he felt personally responsible for the tragedy.But as Antonia Langford writes in her excellent profile of him for The Telegraph today, his words are likely to strike a chord with many Ukrainians who have demanded greater accountability and transparency within the military's command ranks.Both men are recipients of the Hero of Ukraine, the highest state honour, and belong to a younger generation of officers shaped by the war with Russia rather than by the Soviet military.Djapati said Zelensky had set clear tasks for the two men, to continue and intensify offensive actions in all domains, plan new operations behind enemy lines, develop the army and technologies, and increase the capabilities of the armed forces.Western defence officials told the Financial Times they're happy with these new appointments, but the question remains as to the fate of the two men.Demonstrators have said they will continue to meet until he is reappointed defence minister.

So this isn't over.But let's go to Jade first of all today.Jade, on Friday's episode, you gave a very insightful perspective on the power pockets within the state hierarchy and this being a more deeply rooted and complex power struggle than it may appear on the surface.What's your understanding of what's unfolded in the past 72 hours?

It seemed very much to me that President Zelensky has listened.And I think, you know, lots of people are talking about the protests, the civilian protests.And I think they've clearly, you know, over Mihailo Fedorov's removal as defense minister, and I think clearly they've been, you know, very important.But I also think that perhaps the most important element that's happened here has been Zelensky's, President Zelensky's decision to go and speak to commanders, and, you know, for frontline troops as well, to kind of have their voices heard.And to be honest with you, to say things that I think anybody forgive me, probably also who are journalists, but I think especially if you're not a journalist and you have friends who are serving, I mean many of the things that they will have said, that they appear to have said are pretty familiar topics and not recent.And I think, you know, I always quote Bogdan Krusewicz, but it's just I really like his kind of insights and analysis of the kind of civil -military relations.

He sort of addressed brigade officers on the 16th of July and said, you know, speak out now, But he also addressed the risk, because if it hadn't worked out, and if General Siskey had not been replaced, they had to gamble a little bit that it would work out, because otherwise they could have found their units really at the short end of the stick in terms of what they were being provided.At least that's their interpretation of the risk, that they would be notwith let's say the best equipment or you know in a timely way again that's their assessment i'm not making that allegation that that definitely happened just to stay on the right side of everybody um but they did speak out and you know about the the kind of the non -combat losses about the violence about the unlawful detentions you know that happened sometimes of soldiers who are deemed to have misbehaved and it's it's paid off and i think you always, I always, always feels a sort of a little bit, forgive me Americans, but a little bit kind of saccharine and American say, like, feels like a victory for democracy.But it is a sign, you know, of how democracy does course correct, you know, even in very difficult circumstances.

Jade, what's your assessment then of the new commander?

Partly that it's not really my place to assess General Trafalgar, but he is someone who's known as being humble, as somebody who takes accountability and I think that's so important not just in Ukraine but almost for our modern state of politics.It's so rare for somebody to take accountability and I mean his in 2025 when he resigned over deaths of soldiers that were not directly his fault but that did come under his area of responsibility.I think it spoke to a man with a pretty firm sense of honour and accountability.He's Of course, perhaps at the minute, most famous for that video in 2014 where he drives through the kind of paid pro -Russian protesters, and some of them just Russian protesters, in Mariupol in 2014 on the tank.And to be fair, it's a pretty cool video.But yes, he's seen as very humane, as somebody who's humble, who listens, who's operationally very talented, and as somebody who's of the new generation mindset.

And so should be able to, you know, who has worked with Mahalo Fedorov on many of his initiatives, of course, you know, we were talking about thesoldiers and the civilians, you know, the civilians had the protest and the soldiers used that space to kind of speak up about what they felt was, you know, what they see as the reality on the frontline and the issues with the general staff.And that speaks to a very healthy civil -military relationship within society.But, you know, over the years, what's been difficult since the full -scale invasion has been finding a good civil -military balance.You know, we can think of Zelensky and Soluzhny, you know, General Soluzhny, obviously there were difficulties there.Part of the replacement with Sirsky was about finding somebody who didn't have perceived political ambitions, you know.

There have been these tensions now between General Sirsky and Mikhail Fedorov.And of course, at the moment, the acting minister of defense is himself, has himself just been taken out of kind of the SBU where he ran a kind of operational unit.So he's very much a military person.So there's, there's still some balance to be found there.It'll be interesting to see if Mikhail Fedorov does get his role back as Minister of Defence.I have no insights into that, but let's be hopeful that the civil -military sort of alliance that we saw among the public and broader society can also find a nice balance in the centre where it's so important.

Well, thanks very much, Jade.Earlier, I spoke to Dimco to hear a soldier's view.He's currently in Dnipro, where he's working as a lessons learned analyst after his transition from a drone pilot in the 430th Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces.And you'll hear his assessments of those lessons in a future episode.But let's hear him now.

I would regard the mood as quite positive, quite optimistic.He's a very positive commander of Ukraine's armed forces.He started this war fighting theater in 2014 as a battalion commander, a career officer, was in the hardship battle and was commanding the hardship battle.of Russia's 2014 invasion.And through the invasion in 2022, he proved himself extremely efficient and human -centric, I would say.So I'd expect more of what we are already doing in terms of the technocratization of the armed forces of Ukraine, upping up the technical expertise, having more of the robots do the job instead of humans, because we value them so much and we don't really have a lot of them, obviously.

So the mood is quite positive and quite optimistic, but it's not because Sersky was bad or anything like this.That's because we have changes and changes people with more momentum.I think it's quite positive for the armed forces, even though it's a big risk.

But does Dr Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute agree?Jack is considered one of the leading experts on the Ukrainian military.

General Sirski was often criticized for handing down directives from on high, walking into brigades and sort of taking over from the commanders and being very prescriptive.Tripathi, as his successor, is a more junior officer and he is more consultative.I think he will want to win the confidence of the brigade commanders in terms of the support the general staff can provide.And so he's likely to spend some time doing what could be called battlefield circulation, trying to understand the situation that isn't, you know, as he's inherited it across the front, and then try and make sure that he can support.The problem that the Ukrainians have, I think, generally, is that that shouldn't really be the job of a chief of defense.You know, Syrskiy and Solzhenitsyn before him were quite focused on actively commanding the fight day to day.

And they tended to be directed from Stavka by Zelensky to go and fix problems on the front.They spent a lot of time out of Kiev and a lot of time trying to manage the battle.But when we're talking about a war of this scale, the decisions that are made at the center really don't manifest as options on the battlefield for weeks or months.And so one of the big challenges is that the chief of defense needs to be thinking in much longer timeframes.And the Ukrainians haven't really had somebody doing that.The defense minister Fedorov was doing that.

But he was obviously thwarted because he needed to implement through the military and Serskiy wasn't very interested in that process.And so the challenge here is, I think, that Trupati, having come from the force, being promoted upwards, will risk reverting to being the commander in the field, which is not necessarily what the force needs.What the force needs is somebody who is thinking about how will the force fight in the winter early next year, if there are negotiations, how will they maintain a steady position and making decisions now that will only come to fruition then.And so the question is whether Tripathi can expand the horizon of his thinking out of the problem set that he's been living for the last four and a half years and taking a longer view.

Now, I think it's worth us taking a moment to considerlikely legacy of Mr. Serski.So, Jade, where to start on this?Do you think history is going to be kind to him?

I think history will probably be kinder to him than some of what's being written today.But, you know, it's very, it's very difficult.Some of the some of the terrible things that happened in some of his reportedly kind of favoured brigades, such as Skellige, they were really distressing and of course, you know, a lot of it is anecdotal, but I heard many, many stories, you know, about similar issues.over the times.And to be honest, you know, many of them predated Sierski and often I think it's a little bit of a cop -out to just blame General Sierski.I think there's a broader issue of kind of a lingering, I would call it Soviet, but I think essentially just inhumane, disrespectful attitude towards what ultimately, you know, some of the brave, well the bravest people in Europe fighting who deserve to be treated, you know, like the heroes they are.

So I think it's complicated and complex I think that it's too easy to make him into a bogeyman, as if it's just a one -man problem, because it isn't.And so I would rally against that while still personally feeling, you know, very happy with the change, is how I would put it.Let's hear Jack Watling's take.

I think Sirski was a competent tactician.And time and again, things would deteriorate somewhere on the front.Zelensky would direct him to go and solve the situation.And he was quite effective at coming in and planning and executing in difficult situations and improving the situation in the part of the front that he was in.managing.Many would say micromanaging.

The problem was that whenever he did this, he would usually draw reserves away from other bits of the front and you would end up with problems somewhere else.And then you'd be sent somewhere else to kind of deal with that.And so he was a tactician in an operational command.And because that led him to firstly, essentially take over command from local commanders when he came in.The feeling was that he was being very directive and just telling people what to do.But also the frustration that he wasn't taking that larger view means that I don't think he's going to come out of this with a great reputation.

Right.I mean, soldiers are certainly very critical of him.But I think also those who were in command positions felt that they were either ignored and neglected by him.because he was focused somewhere else.And very often they were reporting problems to him and nothing was being done to prepare for them until it became a crisis.Or they feel that if they were in the area that he was very focused on, that he had essentially taken away their agency and was commanding the battle.

So I think he wasn't a particularly popular figure.But that isn't to say that he didn't have skills.And I think Feodorov was very clear in his public messaging that he was grateful to Serskiy for his defence of Kiev early in the war, for the operation in Kharkiv that liberated a lot of territory and so on.Obviously, he doesn't bear sole responsibility for those successes, but there's a recognition that he performed well in crisis.

Many soldiers call Serskiy by his nickname, the Butcher, seeing his approach as an example of self -determination.doctrine in action.But what is Dimko's view of Sirski -ism?

The fact that we are still standing right now and standing quite strong, I think it's largely one of his biggest achievements.He carried us through some darkest hours of the war fighting, specifically 2024, where the recruitment numbers were at its lowest, when we were losing ground, losing ground fast.And he came in and fixed a lot of things, not even taking into account his service beforehand.He is quite technological guy from what I have seen and the doctrine changes that we have been observing here in the Armed Forces.And it is quite unfair to call him butcher or anything like this, because the warfare itself, it has shown that we are fighting extremely technological theater of war with tons of tools.The fact that we have the unmanned systems forces, old -run type of force, And we are not being all thrown into the infantry to assault trenches or something like this.

It's a prime example of technologies in the armed forces.And he works at the intersection of the land warfare, assault actions, maneuver warfare, and drone warfare.I would say that he cemented his legacy as the first ever drone general ever, like in the history of wars.And the fact that First, combined operations, combined arms operations, such as assaulting and then you have tons of drone force covering you.I think that was made under Serskiy's command, which we have to pay some respect to him for that.And also it is critical to mention that he, I think, operated on enormous, enormous pressure, public, political, from civil society with all of that kind of a butcher narrative.

But I think he took that very stoically and was able to carry through that.So I think that in any war of such a scale, that would be enormous losses.So basically commander -in -chief and general staff is just administrators for the war machine.And war machine will always mean killing, administering the deaths of your enemy and administering the deaths of your own.I think there on a strategy side, I think he did great and therefore I would expect to general Mykhailo Drapaty to live up to at least those standards.So I think Ukrainian society here in the armed forces and civil society, we have very high expectations of Mykhailo Drapaty and possibly of Mykhailo Fedorov coming back in some chief role of either in the Ministry of Defense or under the National Security and Defense Council.

That is certainly rumored, but let's stay with the tension between Serskiy and Fedorov.Jack has written a piece for the Royal United Services Institute where he shows with tangible examples how Fedorov would try to bring in a reform and Serskiy would effectively block it.We'll link to that in the show notes.Some argue that Serskiy was never going to be popular because he was willing to commit large numbers of troops to dangerous operations, whereas someone like Fedorov, with his emphasis on drone warfare over traditional infantry combat, was always likely likely to be more popular.among the soldiery.Here's Jack's view on that.

I wouldn't compare Fedorov and Serskiy in this context because they are fundamentally different jobs.But if we compare Serskiy with other commanders in the AFU, it wasn't that he was giving orders that led to people being killed that drove his unpopularity.It was a perception of his willingness to take those casualties.and his lack of concern about casualties that drove that.You know, I know commanders of Ukrainian units who are extremely popular with their men and have had days where they have taken very, very heavy casualties and have had to push their people into positions to hold them where they are just getting chewed up at an unsustainable level because they know that if they lost the particular position that they were holding, the flank would collapse, essentially, and they would lose much more territory.And good commanders are able to convince their people that the sacrifice they are asking of them is necessary, but also that they don't take those decisions lightly, and that they are doing what they can to mitigate the risk to their personnel.

Whereas the feeling of many who were under Sierski's command was that he was quite comfortable with the idea that, you know, you lose people doing operations and therefore that's just the cost that has to be borne.And he would tell people to go away and do things that were not necessarily always considered necessary.And he didn't, he, partly this is a challenge of operational security.He used to plan in a very, very closed group, but the result was when he was giving his orders, there was very littleexplanation as to why it mattered.Because he didn't want those plans being exposed.

So you know, a lot of the times he was behaving in a way where there was a logic to why he was doing it that way.But it brought with it a very, yeah, a bad reputation.I think further off being reappointed would make a fairly good team in the relationship between the general staff and the ministry.Deropati and Fedorov have a much closer alignment of how they view the future and how the force should be prepared and trained and so on.The issue for Zelensky, I think, is that, you know, he can walk this back as a mistake, but he will have to concede that it was a mistake if he does that, because he took the decision to remove him, right?And so given that you can't have an election during martial law and in the context of the ongoing conflict, you start running into issues of like, well, who's actually driving the government?

So I think Zelensky, it's a difficult one versus Zelensky, but it would be a fairly, I think, sensible move in terms of how the military is performing.There is the question as well as to what Feodorov and his team have learned from this, because they were extremely combative when he was in the ministry with the general staff.They bypassed the general staff when it came to decision making, they set up parallel structures, and they alienated a lot of officers that they probably didn't think were very effective, but were nonetheless, you know, doing important work in many cases.And so, There's also a question as to whether, if Fedorov comes back to the ministry, there can be a process of reconciliation, institutional reconciliation.

Yesterday, friend of the podcast Sebastian Lindstrom sent a video of a soldier holding up at one of the protests a placard that said, why should I die for Serskiy's stupid ambitions?I asked Dimko whether the soldiers are still with Mr Fedorov today.

So with Fedorov, it's quite complicated because I think he's one of the very first competent ministers of defense, or I would say the most competent that we ever had in Ukraine's Ministry of Defense.He is a very good manager.He is very technology oriented.He is efficient, optimizing stuff.I think the main aspect of what he has done is in the procurement and logistics of buying things on open tenders and promoting the fair competition and the market of the weapon that we use at the battlefield.So it's less corruption that is so typical for the military industrial complex in each and every country in the world.

I respect him wholeheartedly.hopefully for that and it optimized the resources, the very limited resources that we have.Apart from that, the conflict that he had with some of the generals and the general staff and with the former commander -in -chief Sirsky, I don't think that it's ever good to have stuff like that at a country at war.And the mood among the soldiers was mostly towards Federer.

We'll return to our guests later to hear their thoughts on the general strategic picture.But first, there are other updates.It was another dramatic night with two more massive facilities owned by Wildberries, Russia's Amazon in southern Russia.They were the company's fourth and sixth largest, comprising around 270 ,000 There were also 13 more ships struck across the Sea of Azov.and the Black Sea, according to the Unmanned Systems Forces.Widespread power outages were reported also across occupied Crimea.

In the diplomatic realm, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will meet Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov tomorrow at the ASEAN summit currently taking place in Manila, Philippines.Here's what he had to say going into that.

That doesn't mean we won't seek to address it.find other areas of potential cooperation.But by the same token, we'd like to see that war come to an end.We think it would be good for Russia if that war came to an end.So we'll raise it.And as I said, the U .

S.remains open and willing to play a constructive role in bringing that war to an end if that opportunity presents itself.And it might.We're open to it, to playing that role, because we think right now, and I think the Russians would agree, we're probably the only country in the world that can play that role in trying to bring that to an end.

According to the Moscow Times, Russia's domestic fuel market is beginning to stabilise after weeks of shortages, with the Deputy Prime Minister saying government intervention is easing pressure.He said a temporary ban on petroleum exports, increased fuel imports, higher refinery output and rescheduled refinery maintenance have improved supplies, while officials continue working with energy companies to address the remaining shortages.However, conditions allegedly vary by region and the market has only partially stabilised.Citing reporting from Reuters, fuel shortages have been forcing authorities to reroute supplies from Siberia and increase imports from Belarus to protect fuel availability in Moscow and surrounding areas.And that seems like an opportune moment for us to consider the general strategic picture in the war.Who should we go first with?

Let's go with Jade and her assessment.

I think the strategic picture is looking more optimistic.I mean, honestly, until probably the end of last year,I was increasingly sort of frustrated with what I felt was a lack of sort of, not even a lack of strategic vision, but certainly a lack of an integrated strategic vision, you know, sort of in among sort of top leaders.And there's many reasons for that, including, you know, we all struggled to adapt to the US's new position, global positioning.I think that it's very promising that some, you know, This appointment of General Drapati makes it look likely, and I think we have every reason to be optimistic, that some of this more integrated strategic thinking around what Ukraine is trying to achieve, how to achieve it, how to find ways around the obstacles, essentially all of that great Ukrainian innovation and lateral thinking will be able to continue on the very positive trajectory it's been on for 2026 and only improve.So I think it looks positive.

You know, the focus, I think that we'll see a continuation of, you know, the focus on drones, the focus on on, you know, middle and deep strikes, and on, I suppose, bringing bringing the water to Russia and to Russians more so a kind of longer term strategy and a realism.

Here's Jack Watling's view.So, the situation on the front at the moment is fairly positive for Ukraine.Russian combat power is lower than it was last year, and the Russians are really struggling to make significant progress.They are gaining some territory in Donbass around Kostiantynivka, where they also have a significant advantage in the drone battle, but they're losing territory elsewhere, and the Russians are nowhere near their timeline.The challenge, I think, is that while Ukrainian manpower is fairly stable at the moment, that's a fragile trend.The reforms are needed to improve it.

and it can be improved quite significantly.So Ukraine has latent capacity there or potential.But we are headed towards another very difficult winter.We are headed towards a harder funding environment in Europe.And we are looking at the risk that the Russians feel that they have to mobilize or go into another partial mobilization, which could change the dynamics at the front in quite unfavorable ways for Ukraine.And so I think the key thing now is leaving the core commanders and supporting them to get themselves into the best position possible at the front, supporting those units that are putting the Russians under pressure by conducting attacks on logistics and some offensive action, but planning for the future and making sure that the force is has a sustainable basis for its defence as we go into the next fighting season.

We've spoken before on the podcast about the risks for Putin of another partial military mobilisation.But is that a risk they feel they have to take?And if so, can they survive it?

The Russian military has been asking for this for some time.And Putin has been extremely reluctant, firstly, because the FSB have advised that there are political risks.But also the Central Bank has made very clear that there's a labour shortage and combined with displacement of people trying to flee the country and so on, this could have a very, very serious economic impact.And so the Kremlin has not wanted to go down this route.I think they can do it.The question is how messy it is and at what cost.

So I think there is a fair risk that it happens.Putin usually makes these decisions as late as possible.But if he feels it's necessary, he probably will.Not least because, I mean, there's There's two ways we can look at mobilisation.One is an attempt to significantly expand the size of Russian forces, which would be extremely dangerous for Ukraine.Also very, very politically risky for Russia, but that would potentially allow them to open up another axis of attack and put the Ukrainians under a lot of pressure.

The other way that this works is that the Russians are simply trying to make up for the drop off in recruitment through volunteer.enlistment.And if that's the case, then what they're probably doing is setting the conditions whereby if they enter a negotiation, they are not on a timeline where their manpower will dwindle, and therefore their negotiating position will weaken over the course of the negotiations.It will instead set a foundation where they can keep fighting if they have to.And so their negotiating position will remain robust.So this could develop in a couple of different ways.

Thanks to Jack and all my guests today for their insights, a historic one by all accounts.Let's hear our guests' final thoughts then.I asked Dimko earlier about whether there remained a mood of optimism in the country.

Yes, yes.I think that we are looking at a we are so back moment.And obviously more towers in the winter when Russia strikes will bring much more destruction and damage and inconvenience to Ukraine's population.Obviously the mood will have some mood swings going on.But overall, I think all of the people in the country and especially the armed forces and the people who take part in the deep strike campaign, they're extremely proud of Ukraine's ability of how we are perceived as subject when it comes to kinetic long range sanctions applied towards Russia.And I would even go as far as saying that those sanctions, Ukrainian sanctions, they provided much bigger effect than everything else that we have, like 40 something packages that we had before from European Union and other allies.

So I think that people in Ukraine are quite proud of our capabilities, of our fighters and of the fight that we were able to put up and the fact that we are still here and it seems likely that we will be able to defend our homes and keep our independence.So I think Ukraine must prioritize the scale of the strategic strikes, both in terms of the ballistic missile program that we have developed and both in terms of the deep strike drones that we have developed here in Ukraine and successfully applied towards the Russian Federation to cease their existence in many aspects, specifically economically.Because the economic power that Russia has, it actually fuels the war machine, it enables them to pay for all the arms, it enables them to pay for all of the soldiers and fighters that they throw at us in enormous quantities each and every month.

My final thoughts for today are, you know, this is good news, but I really liked Ambassador General Valery Zelensky's point that, you know, it's going to be really difficult.There are many problems within the Ukrainian army.What I don't want is for people, you know, who, because this is a positive change, but we all have to be aware that this is a country that's completely exhausted after more than four years of full scale war.You know, it is difficult in terms of manpower.There's trust now in the army that can start to be rebuilt among some of those who didn't want to serve.I hope that this becomes an opportunity for doing so, but let me know.

believe and always work towards the optimistic, but I think let's also not get our hopes up so high that poor General Drapati ends up inevitably, given the situation that he has to deal with, ends up being a disappointment because that won't help anybody.Dr Jack Watling?

I think the centrality of Ukraine's conscription process to This dispute between Fedorov and Sersky is very important.It's a very emotive issue in Ukraine.And what Fedorov was trying to do before he was removed was move the basis of recruitment away from the armed forces going around and just lifting people from the streets, putting them in detention and then holding them until they could go through training, to instead notifying people in advance so that they had a period of time where they could get their affairs in order, bringing them into the force, not indefinitely, but for a fixed term of service.So it's essentially you do your turn and then you're exempt for a period.And improving the quality of training so that people had more confidence that if they came forward, they would be supported through the process.And those are all really important things if Ukraine is going to sustain its defense and show the Russians that it can sustain its defense.

So the key question here is putting aside the personalities and the question of whether Fedorov comes back and so on.Are these reforms going to be implemented or not?Are they going to be advanced?Because they have some really, really important second order effects in terms of Ukraine's capacity to sustain resistance.

Thanks to all of my guests today.Another historic day.We will be back same time next week.place tomorrow to bring you more updates on this fast moving situation.See you then.