US Declares Fertilizer EMERGENCY As Iran War Fallout Continues

Checking in on the latest with regards to the Iran war, the negotiations, are they on, are they not on?What is the vice president of the United States saying?We are joined this morning by our friend, Tricia Parsi of the Quincy Institute.Great to see you, sir.

Good to be with you guys.

So let me first get your reaction to these comments from JD Vance that caught a lot of attention where he seems to indicate that they are using this moment of a pause in hostilities to quote unquote refill the oil market.Let's take a listen.

There are a few things that we want.We want durable commitments that are verifiable and backed up by inspections that Iran will denuclearize their entire country.Okay, we're gonna see how we get there.Number two, we want to see what kind of an arrangement actually exists in the Middle East between not just Iran and the United States, but the GCC, Israel, Lebanon.We're going to play that situation out.And then on the Strait of Hormuz, I mean, I think you actually said it well, which is that the Strait is open in the sense that to oil traffic, we're seeing more oil come out of the Strait of Hormuz.

And some days, actually, more oil coming out of the Strait than came out before the war even started.So there's this element of the, you know, where the world oil economy is kind of getting back into gear, that's going to take a little bit of time, but you've already seen the prices come way down.Now, what the cynics will say as well, if you look at the number of ships that are trafficking, that's actually down from the pre -war start.But they're mostly talking about cargo ships and other vessels.At least so far, what we've seen is the oil traffic has reached its pre -war height.So I think what the president has told us to do is use this MOU to sort of refill the world's oil economy, to refill some stocks, and then to see where the hand is.

You know, as I've said this repeatedly, if the Iranians are willing to make the commitments that we would like them to make and are willing to back those up with verifiable milestones, then we are going to change our relationship with Iran.And if they don't do that, then nothing has really changed except for what we've already accomplished from the military campaign.

So he says that the president wants to use the MOU to

I think there's some people in the administration that are probably not that excited about this diplomacy, and they have a plan B in case it doesn't work out, and they want to pursue their plan A in a manner that ensures that their plan B is stronger.I think the Iranians are doing exactly the same thing.This is part of the reason why they're insisting on their position on the Strait of Hormuz, part of the reason why they're insisting on their position in Lebanon.It's very much in case there is no plan A, there is no deal, that they will be in a position to be able to face the United States in another war, if that is what it comes to.So in and of itself, I'm not particularly surprised.Perhaps it was formulated in a way that gives the impression that the plan B actually is the plan A, that this whole thing is all about making sure that you restock the storage of oil in order to make sure that you can go to war again.

I'm not under that impression that that is actually what the administration is doing.I do think, however, there is a significant risk that that is where we will end up.Not because the intent is to go there, but because either diplomacy doesn't work or because diplomacy is sabotaged.I also want to point out one thing.Part of the reason why oil prices never went up as high as they could have during this war was because by pure happenstance, the inventory of oil globally was extremely high.So if the idea is to go back and in some ways improve on that situation, I think it might be actually difficult because it was extremely high in the first place.

And we still had a major, major oil shock and increase of prices.And again, the Iranians never went backthe infrastructure of oil in the Persian Gulf states in a manner that they could have, which was one of the cards that they kept close to their chest.They could have played it if there was further escalation.So if the idea is that some way, somehow, because of the MOU, the United States is going to be in a much better position to launch a war that militarily will be more successful than the previous one, Color me skeptic.I don't think the U .

S.has that option, even if the inventory of oil is restocked.

And this is exactly what we wanted to ask you about next.We can put B2 up on the screen.Professor at the University of Tehran, Syed Marandi, responded to the Michael Mills interview that J .D.Vance did, you just watched that, by saying, Iran is rapidly rebuilding its civilian infrastructure, stockpiling critical supplies, advancing new weapons systems, replacing thousands of destroyed decoys, fielding emerging technologies, and expanding its network of underground bases and command and control centers.From your understanding, is that an accurate description of what's happening right now?

I suspect so.This is also exactly what the Iranians did after the June war, and they did it much more successfully than I think U .S.intelligence and Israeli intelligence expected, because they were quite ready for that war that came later on.So again, I think it's very important to understand both sides are taking a bet on a plan A that diplomacy could work.But neither one of them are walking into this situation thinking plan A is so solid, so likely to succeed that there is no need for a plan B and for a plan C. Both of them are investing heavily in those as well.

The question is, does it mean that the plan A is fake, that there actually isn't a real intent to make it work?At least when it comes to what I've seen so far, given how far the administration has gone in, for instance, pushing back Israelis, the progress that is made.at the negotiating table, the signals they are sending about a new relationship and how the Iranians are responding and receiving those, I do think that there is a serious plan A from both sides.I'm more worried about that there may be elements who are trying to sabotage this, whether it is the Israelis or whether it is some of these recent things that have happened.So for instance, the MOU that the U .S.

side mediated between Israel and Lebanon, to me looks very much like an effort to sabotage the MOU altogether.And that was done by a different part of the administration.

Let's talk a little bit more about that.Put B3 up on the screen.This was your analysis over at your Substack, which, guys, if you aren't subscribed to Tree2Substack yet, I don't know what you're doing.The headline here is, Why Iran Believes Israel Will Attack Again Before October, the Recent Israeli -Lebanese Agreement, and Hezbollah's Unreported Role in the Previous War is Leading Tehran to this Conclusion.So, break down your analysis here and why you think that deal with Lebanon is such a problem.

So the deal with Lebanon puts forward a completely different approach on how to deal with Israel's presence in Lebanon.It makes a condition for the Israelis to leave Lebanon, and that condition is the disarmament of Hezbollah.The disarmament of Hezbollah will not happen unless there is some sort of a civil war that breaks out in Lebanon in which against all odds Hezbollah loses.So it essentially ensures that Israel will stay in Lebanon for a very long time.The entire document is read as if the Lebanese government is partnering with Israel who is occupying Lebanese territory against Hezbollah as if Hezbollah is a common threat to both of them rather than Israel being a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.This is completely different from the MOU.

The MOU essentially suggests thatIsraelis have to leave all of Lebanese territory by the end of the MOU.It does not make a condition for that being that Hezbollah has to be disarmed, although there's going to be part of the negotiations on whether Hezbollah will move further up north in Lebanon, north of the Litani River or other things.But nevertheless, there is no suggestion that Israel will stay in Lebanon for for as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed.So this completely flips the entire equation.And part of the reason why this is now really worried the Iranians is because they believe that the Israelis have managed to do this because they're currently holding certain positions in Lebanon that were held by Hezbollah during the war and were critical for Hezbollah's participation in that war, which has been highly underreported.

The Iranians tell me that they've only used about 40 % of their offensive capability against Israel during the war because they didn't need to because Hezbollah was so active.And this diverted Israeli forces and defense capabilities because they had to face that front from Hezbollah as well.By now having taken those positions, Hezbollah's ability to participate in the next war is compromised.And this gives the Israelis a very significant advantage, not a decisive one according to the Iranians, but a significant advantage in which they can launch a war again without having to worry about Hezbollah having the same potency that it did during the war.And incidentally, we never heard about any of Hezbollah's Hezbollah's activities, or at least the extent to which they were affected, because of this near -complete Israeli censorship of what was going on during the war inside of Israel.

You mentioned that the Hezbollah part of the agreement was being negotiated.a different part of the administration.I'm assuming, Chita, you're referring to Rubio's State Department world versus Vance Witkoff's world.Is that what your understanding is of the dynamic here between what's being negotiated with the Iranians on the Strait of Hormuz and other territorial Iranian questions versus what's happening with the Lebanese negotiations?

I think there's a very common perception that Rubio is not particularly excited about the nuclear deal, about the MOU.And now suddenly he got very active in the region, which he had not been before, and spent most of his time focusing on Cuba and Venezuela.And then you had disagreement as well as a joint statement by the GCC states that took a very pro -American position when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz.So there was a flurry of activities by Rubio suddenly in the region, the perception regionwide, not just on the Iranian side, is that this is done in a way that undermines the MOU because there is a struggle within the administration.I can't claim that I can confirm that that is true or not.But if you're standing on the outside, it certainly does look this way.

And I find it very difficult to read the MOU and the Lebanese agreement in a manner that makes them compatible with each other.They actually seem to be almost designed to be incompatible.The timeframe, the conditions, everything is different.And this also tells you why it was so important for the Iranians to make sure that Lebanon was a red line for them.Because it meant that if it wasn't, if Israel could remain in Lebanese territory, if they were not pushed out as part of the MOU, that Israelis and the U .S.

would be in a much stronger position to attack Iran again, which goes back to what I said earlier on.Obviously, the Iranians have been workingon their plan B and their plan C just as much as the US administration has.And this contradicts their plan B. If the Israelis remain in Lebanon, it means that Iran's ability to defend itself if Israel attacks again, which incidentally, the Iranians believe is now inevitable, because there's another aspect that comes into play here, which is by October, the Israelis are going to have their elections.And Prime Minister Netanyahu is already in a bad shape as a result of the MOU, as a result of him not being able to deliver the United States.He's being attacked by all sides for this failure from their perspective.

And if he loses that election, he just doesn't lose his political career, he will then also lose his immunity when it comes to the corruption charges that he faced, and as a result may end up in jail.So he has all the incentives in the world right now, both political, personal and strategic to launch a war and keeping those positions in Lebanon makes it much easier for Israel to do so.

Let's talk a little bit more about the economic realities.If we go back to the first clip we played there, Vice President J .D.Vance saying basically like, yeah, we're getting the oil market back to normal.We're refilling it.Certainly the administration wants to project a lot of economic confidence.

At the same time, before up on the screen, there was a declaration of emergency and authorization for temporary duty -free importation of phosphate fertilizer from Morocco.It is not just the oil market.markets that are impacted by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.Fertilizer, we've all learned, is also a very important commodity that flows through that area and comes from that area.So what did you make of this announcement?Does it indicate that there is perhaps more economic pressure and strain continuing on the U .

S.and the global economy than what the administration wants to project?

Well, there certainly is much more becausethere is the oil impact, it's the fuel impact, and then it's all of the different secondary impacts.And one of the most important secondary impacts is fertilizer, for which a lot of oil products, of course, are needed for.And the fertilizer, of course, are tremendously important because it feeds all of our agriculture, which means that it feeds our food.And if we don't have food, we have a completely different crisis rather than just people having to pay a little bit too much at the gas pumps.So we always knew that there was going to be these repercussions.

Now if these repercussions coincided with a continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, obviously it would have been much worse.But this is at a minimum reducing it, but it doesn't mean that we're completely out of the woods or that these secondary impacts are not going to occur.They're going to occur, but they're likely going to be less impactful or detrimental than they would have been, of course, had the Strait continued to be closed.But this is part of the reason why I'm very skeptical about the idea that just restocking these the oil inventory is going to make sure that everything is going to be fine and the next war is going to be fantastic.I think that's a highly optimistic view from the perspective of anyone in the administration who would think that and I'm not really sure that that is what they're thinking.

Do you think the Iranians and the U .S.have a slightly different conception of the pressures on the oil market?I was reading one analysis that said, effectively, what the Iranians are really watching is the strategic petroleum reserves, which continue to go down.So even as there is more flow into the oil market, that there continues to be a pressure that is mounting over this time period, because I know one of the internal arguments in Iran is whether or not they should have even moved forward with this MOU, whether they are losing some leverage in the meantime.What's your understanding of those arguments.

No I think the strategic reserves are tremendously important.And first you're going to see therest of the global economy being able to absorb this oil before you will see the strategic reserves being restocked.And that, again, is going to take some time before you have that type of a full restocking that would bring us back to the previous situation.There is obviously an argument on the Iranian side that says that they should have gone further.They should have attacked the GCC states more aggressively, particularly the UAE.

They should have kept this going longer than they did in order to get the strategic reserves to go down even further.And the question is, at the same time, there is a flip side of that argument, which is, if you wait too long, You will also then make it more difficult for the administration to have the time needed to be able to provide the sanctions relief that would come through a deal that you're trying to achieve.After the midterms, Most likely, the Republicans are not going to do that well, at least in the House.Trump is going to have less leverage than he did before.He's going to walk into becoming more of a lame duck.His ability to provide and deliver on the sanctions relief that would be agreed upon in a potential MOU starts to get compromised.

And as a result, it actually weakens Iran's ability to be able to get a good deal.This is part of the problem that was happening during the JCPOA.The JCPOA, in many ways, was overnegotiated.them way too long to get to that deal.And as a result, by the time they got the deal, the administration had very little time left to make sure that the implementation was solid enough to protect it from any future presidents trying to walk out of it.And as a result, it became weaker than what it otherwise could have been.

You don't want to repeat that mistake now by allowing the negotiations to take way too long time.And then by the time the deliverance of the differentagreements is supposed to take place, the U .S.S.side is going to be too weak to be able to fulfill those promises.

I wanted to get your take on this big New York Times piece as well.We can put the next element up on the screen about U .S.-Saudi relations.Kind of going under the radar this week is that the Saudi foreign minister is in China.The Times' headline is, which is sort of a remarkable headline, of course, given the close ties between Trump, certainly between Jared Kushner, his son -in -law, and the Saudi crown prince.

Reading a bit from the piece here, it reports, Does this story resonate with you Trita?Does this sound like an accurate rendering of what's happening behind the scenes and what could the consequences be of that?

I think the overall picture absolutely resonates that you're seeing, first of all, that the Saudis at first were actually in favor of this war.They did provide military support.But I think they were deeply disappointed.They thought the U .S.was going to be much more effective in this war.

They too had underestimated the strength of the Iranians.They had overestimated the impact of the protests when it came to the fragility of the Iranian theocracy.So they were disappointed in seeing how this whole thing went down and then were questioning many of the different decisions that the U .S.made going forward and did not want to see meaningless escalation that only would lead to the Saudis and the other GCC states suffering more without really changing the strategic picture.And that's part of the reason why they stood up in a few couple of occasions against this.

But they had also struck their own deal most likely with the Iranians.Part of the reason why the Saudis did not get the brunt of the attacks, in fact, a very little amount of attacks from the Iranians in comparison, to other states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE.So I think at least relatively early on in the war, the Saudis realized this is not going the way they thought, this is not going the way the U .S.thought, and they started to look at their options instead of blindly following the United States, realizing that the U .S.

didn't know where it was going.And the fact that they are now coordinating with the Chinese, that they're looking for further diversification, is going to be a pattern that we are very likely to see, not just with them, but with many of the other GCC states as well, including the UAE.The UAE may very well double down on its relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia, but it is simultaneously striking deals with Iranians.They struck a deal with Iranians just in the last couple of weeks, which is part of the reason why when it came to the last round of exchange of fire between the U .S.and Iran, the Iranians retaliated against Kuwait and Bahrain and did not strike the Emiratis because they had already struck a deal.

So you're going to see a lot of double play, a lot of countries making deals with many of the different actors instead of just simply putting all of their eggs back into one basket.That's what they did before.It didn't work.

They're going for diversification now.And lastly, what is your understanding?Are talks happening this week?Are they not happening this week?Do we expect another market -timed resume of bombing campaigns here over the weekend?

What do you think?I mean, talks did occur in Doha.Whether they get renewed or not remains to be seen.You know, I think we should also remember we've seen a tremendous amount of drama and tremendous high destabilization.all kinds of statements, even threats, etc.Nevertheless, with some delay, talks have gone forward.

And I think it is a reminder of the fact, and in fact, on top of just high decibel, we also saw attacks from both sides.I think it is a reminder at the end of the day, neither side really wants to go back to a full -scale war.It is not to their benefit.They need to get to some sort of diplomatic arrangement.It is to the benefit of both of them as well as for many others as well.So there will, unfortunately, be a lot of snafus and a lot of elements of escalation.

But so far, we have not seen the talks collapse altogether.Could they absolutely have a couple of more of these types of exchanges of fire between the U .S.and Iran, and it's very difficult to see that this MOU will collapse.But it will not collapse easily.I think that's the lesson we should learn from the last two or three weeks.

All right.Well, that's a hopeful note to end on, Dr. Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute and also of the Trita Parsi Substack.Great to have you, sir.Great to see you again.

Thanks so much for having me.

Appreciate it.

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